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Introduction: Virtue’s Reasons 
Noell Birondo and S. Stewart Braun 
 
I. BACKGROUND TO THE VOLUME 
 
Over the past thirty years or so, virtues and reasons have emerged as two of the most fruitful and 
important concepts in contemporary moral philosophy. Virtue theory and moral psychology, for 
instance, are currently two burgeoning areas of philosophical investigation that involve different, 
but clearly related, focuses on individual agents’ responsiveness to reasons. The virtues 
themselves are major components of current ethical theories whose approaches to substantive or 
normative issues remain remarkably divergent in other respects. The virtues are also increasingly 
important in a variety of new approaches to epistemology. 
Many writers have commented on the close connections between virtues and reasons: for 
instance between the ethical virtues—justice, courage, temperance, honesty, and so on—and the 
different ranges of morally relevant reasons that seem to be intimately, or even conceptually, tied 
to them.1 Even so, the relationship is complicated, and it seems safe to say that no one has yet 
done justice to the complexity of the interconnections between virtues and reasons. To 
compound matters, the more recent growth of virtue epistemology, with its focus on the 
intellectual virtues, only makes the interconnections between virtues and reasons that much more 
challenging for anyone attempting to understand their relationship.   
																																																								
1 Here one might think, especially, of the work of Robert Audi (1995, 2009), Philippa Foot (1978), 
Rosalind Hursthouse (1995, 1999), John McDowell (1979, 1980), Martha Nussbaum (1988), Bernard 
Williams (1995). 
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Virtues and reasons are, of course, by now widely recognized as major concepts that 
figure in almost any kind of serious moral thinking. They also inform philosophical work in 
ethics from a variety of theoretical perspectives, whether Aristotelian (or eudaimonist, or more 
broadly ‘virtue-ethical’), Kantian, consequentialist, or intuitionist. A better appreciation for the 
interconnections between virtues and reasons still seems to be needed, however, since most 
contemporary discussions have focused on how the virtues enable their possessors to appreciate 
and respond to reasons for acting in certain ways, or to the reasons for holding certain attitudes—
ethically relevant attitudes, like admiration or regret, but also epistemic attitudes such as belief, 
which need not be of any particular ethical interest. Virtues and reasons seem to have 
interconnections that are not limited to the specific reasons made available to the individual 
practical intelligence of a deliberating (or inquiring) agent, as such contemporary discussions 
might suggest. Instead, virtues and reasons seem to exist in a network of mutually influential 
relationships, in which specific assessments of a person’s character, or the specific facts that 
constitute (possibly unnoticed) normative reasons for her, are impacted by the nature of these 
relationships. It seems natural to include the wider set of issues that emerges from these 
relationships under the heading of ‘virtue’s reasons.’ 
In exploring such reasons, there are many interesting questions to confront. For instance, 
we might ask whether there actually are adequate reasons—as some recent philosophical 
situationists seem to suggest—for withholding the attribution of virtuous traits based on what 
someone would do in remote hypothetical scenarios. Perhaps such scenarios remain, in fact, 
irrelevant to the proper attribution of the virtues (or other stable traits) to specific individuals. 
There are, moreover, developmental issues regarding what normative reasons there might be for 
aiming, in general and in specific cases, to cultivate the virtues of character in the first place. Do 
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such reasons have a different nature than, say, reasons for action? Are there different sorts of 
reasons here, not just reasons to do certain things, but also reasons to be a certain kind of person 
overall? Addressing such questions could presumably shed light on what it means for someone to 
be a good ethical role model. Connected with those developmental issues are questions 
concerning the reasons there might be for cultivating such seemingly admirable traits as practical 
wisdom, open-mindedness, and modesty—not only as ethical agents, but also as ethical theorists. 
By addressing a diverse set of questions on the connections between virtues and reasons, the 
papers here do not offer a sustained treatment of one or two core issues; instead, the papers that 
we have collected here form, together, a kind of kaleidoscope of issues surrounding the notion of 
virtue’s reasons.2 By appearing together in this one volume, the essays below will hopefully 
allow previously unnoticed patterns to come into view, enabling further research on the multiple 
interconnections between virtues and reasons. 
The main aims of this book are therefore to foster a greater appreciation for the 
multiplicity of reasons surrounding the concept of the virtues and to shed light on what is 
presumably the paradigm case, of an individual agent responding to an array of potential reasons, 
often in diverse circumstances and contexts. The book contains substantive contributions to a 
major topic that still remains underexplored, and it presents novel discussions that should 
enhance philosophical understanding of reasons and their interconnections with the virtues—
especially the virtues of character, but also, in a more modest way, the intellectual virtues as 
																																																								
2 Highly focused collections are, of course, valuable for their own and for obvious reasons. Three recent 
collections along these lines are especially worth mentioning here, Lord and Maguire (2016), Peters 
(2013), and Snow (2015), since they contain valuable additional discussions of some of the key themes 
taken up in the essays presented here. 
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well. Below we outline the structure of the book and preview some of the core issues discussed 
by the contributors. 
 
II. THE CHAPTERS 
 
The volume is divided into three sections. Part I, “Reasons, Character, and Agency,” contains 
contributions regarding the paradigm connection between virtues and reasons. The essays in this 
section analyze how the virtues are tied to, or linked with, normative reasons, in ways that 
improve our understanding of virtuous character and ethical agency. Garrett Cullity argues, in his 
chapter “Moral Virtues and Responsiveness for Reasons,” that our rich vocabulary of ‘aretaic’ 
terms is used in an evaluative manner to assess the quality of our responsiveness to morally 
relevant reasons. According to Cullity, to be virtuous is to be well oriented to morally relevant 
reasons and to respond appropriately for those reasons. In other words, what makes a response 
virtuous is the nature of the response to the relevant reasons. Since any such response seems to 
include three main elements, namely, the reason for the response, the object of the response, and 
the characteristics of the response itself, Cullity sorts the virtues into a three-tiered taxonomy 
based on their place in this overall structure. 
 In “Remote Scenarios and Warranted Virtue Attributions,” Justin Oakley provides an 
analysis of the extent to which remote hypothetical scenarios should play a role in assessing 
whether someone possesses a particular virtue. Oakley examines Kant’s restrictive account, 
according to which remote scenarios are entirely instructive in assessing someone’s virtue, as 
well as Robert Adams’s looser probabilistic account (Adams 2006). Differentiating his position 
from both accounts, Oakley argues that in order for remote scenarios to be useful in assessing 
 5 
someone’s virtue, we need to look beyond the actual or dispositional behavior of an agent to the 
larger set of reasons the agent has for acting, or for being disposed to act, in a particular manner 
in a remote scenario. For Oakley, remote scenarios are diagnostically useful only if we are 
sensitive to the agent’s overall reasons for action. 
 Damian Cox argues, in his chapter “Vice, Reasons, and Wrongdoing,” that aretaic 
judgments can be helpfully mapped onto deontic judgments in order to formulate a theory of 
right action that he calls ‘vice ethics.’ Cox identifies an asymmetry between virtues and vices, 
insofar as the virtues supply only prima facie reasons for action, whereas vices seem to supply 
pro tanto reasons. This distinction implies that if an action is vicious, then we have decisive 
reason not to engage in that action; but virtuous action seems to be optional, since it represents a 
type of moral excellence. Cox argues, then, that while reasons of virtue are supererogatory, 
reasons of vice introduce moral obligations, so that the right action is the “least vicious of 
available actions.” Cox defends this account of ‘vice ethics’ by arguing that the account 
possesses distinct advantages over a near competitor: Michael Slote’s ‘direct virtue ethics’ (Slote 
2001). 
The final chapter in this section is Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu’s essay, “Can Virtue be Codified? 
An Inquiry on the Basis of Four Conceptions of Virtue.” The aim of Tsu’s paper is to challenge 
John McDowell’s well-known ‘uncodifiability’ thesis (McDowell 1979). Tsu identifies four 
ways to conceptualize virtue, depending on how virtue is thought to interact with moral rules in 
the reasoning process of a virtuous person. These are (1) the ‘absolute’ conception, (2) the ‘pro 
tanto’ conception, (3) the ‘prima facie’ conception, and (4) the ‘particularist’ conception. 
According to Tsu, McDowell’s account of virtue is only consistent with either the ‘prima facie’ 
conception or the ‘particularist’ conception. Consequently, because McDowell is not working 
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with either the ‘absolute’ or ‘pro tanto’ conception of virtue, these two conceptions remain 
unaffected by the uncodfiability thesis. Tsu believes that the ‘absolute’ and ‘pro tanto’ 
conceptions of virtue remain plausible, and that therefore virtue might be achieved through some 
kind of rule following after all. 
Part II, “Reasons and Virtues in Development,” contains essays that explore how the 
virtues might be developed or cultivated, so that one acts from virtue and in line with good 
reasons. In his chapter “Virtue, Reason, and Will,” Ramon Das reformulates a dilemma for virtue 
ethics that he has pressed in previous work. Das argues that someone’s acting as she should in a 
certain situation might require that she “transcend” the fixed aspects of character that are given 
such importance in virtue ethics. Das contends that theorists such as Audi (1995), McDowell 
(1979), and Tiberius (2006) tend to run together motivational and normative reasons, so that 
acting “from a virtuous motive” and acting “for a good reason” cannot be properly distinguished 
from one another. Das argues that when the latter two notions are clearly distinguished, we can 
see how someone might rightly determine, “at will” and out of character, the reasons for which 
she acts. Given this diagnosis, Das provides a new formulation of the dilemma facing virtue 
ethicists. He maintains that virtue ethics “remains plausible roughly to the extent that it construes 
acting for a good reason in a way that is not distinctively virtue-ethical.” 
In her chapter “Self-Knowledge and the Development of Virtue,” Emer O’Hagan 
examines what the development of virtue requires and how agents can ensure that they are acting 
from virtue. This leads her to a critique of Robert Audi’s perspective. O’Hagan is largely in 
agreement with Audi that virtue requires a relatively stable character and a sensitivity to the right 
reasons. But she worries about how virtue is developed within Audi’s framework. In particular, 
she disagrees with Audi’s claim that virtue cannot be attained “at will,” that is, directly through 
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an act of self-control. O’Hagan argues that there are techniques of self-reflection and self-
regulation that agents can use to improve their characters. These techniques may vary, but they 
aim at achieving, in O’Hagan’s words, “a morally refined self-conception,” one that enables 
people to understand themselves better so as to act in a more virtuous manner. 
The section concludes with Audi’s wide-ranging chapter, “Aretaic Role Modeling, 
Justificatory Reasons, and the Diversity of the Virtues.” Drawing on an analysis of the ways that 
virtues are modelled and developed, Audi argues for the fundamental importance of 
responsiveness to appropriate reasons. Audi maintains that reasons are more basic than virtues. 
However, he rejects the idea that specific rules can serve as guides to virtue, given the diversity 
of the virtues and the diversity of goods pursued by virtuous action. This view does not imply 
that the virtues are subjective or somehow reducible to normative reasons, nor that people lack 
stable dispositions of character. The point is rather that the virtues cannot be understood in 
isolation from reasons, and that sensitivity to reasons is fundamental to understanding the nature 
of virtue and how virtue can be modelled and developed. 
Part III, “Specific Virtues for Finite Rational Agents,” contains essays with a more 
practical focus. These essays examine how specific virtues interact with reasons. Andrés Luco, in 
his chapter “Practical Wisdom: A Virtue for Resolving Conflicts among Practical Reasons,” 
develops an account of how an agent endowed with the virtue of practical wisdom can decide 
between the rationally incomparable reasons that sometimes confront an agent’s choice. Luco 
contends that the virtuous agent should follow what he calls the ‘Override Principle.’ This 
principle directs someone to choose the course of action that secures some good corresponding to 
one type of reason, when doing so does not result in the loss of any goods corresponding to 
another type of reason. Luco defends the Override Principle against objections and concludes 
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that it can serve to assist the practically wise agent in deliberating among rationally incomparable 
normative reasons.  
In “The Virtue of Modesty and the Egalitarian Ethos,” S. Stewart Braun develops a novel 
account of modesty. After analyzing recent approaches to understanding the virtue of modesty, 
Braun argues that, despite the shortcomings of these approaches, they all show a modest agent to 
be responsive to egalitarian reasons.	According to Braun’s analysis, a modest agent is disposed 
to act in a manner that attempts to avoid establishing or endorsing distinctions in social status or 
respect because the agent accepts the value of social equality. This ‘Egalitarian Account’ of 
modesty explains why modesty manifests itself in people’s characters and dispositions in diverse 
ways, and why modest agents may act in the ways described by the competing theories. Braun 
contends that his Egalitarian Account of modesty provides a unified account of the virtue that 
helps to dissolve the debate about its nature and also to explain why modesty is admirable.  
In the final chapter of this volume, “Virtue and Prejudice: Giving and Taking Reasons,” 
Noell Birondo discusses what he calls the ‘long-standing’ criticism of Aristotelian virtue ethics. 
The target of the long-standing criticism is a foundational appeal to nature that purports to 
validate certain traits of character as virtues of character. Birondo argues that this criticism only 
properly targets what he calls an ‘external’ validation of the virtues and that it fails to appreciate 
the resources available to an ‘internal’ validation of the virtues. An internal validation would 
require, he says, an open-ended form of reflective scrutiny, a “giving and taking” of reasons with 
others, even those whose ethical outlooks differ radically from our own. Birondo’s account 
advocates a widening of cultural perspectives in order to overcome a regrettable form of 
prejudice: an illiberal form of prejudice that can impede the rational revision of our own 
evaluative outlook. 
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Overall, this book collects valuable new essays that we believe will influence the course 
of further research on virtue ethics and moral psychology. However, we recognize that this 
collection is far from representative of all the excellent work being done throughout the 
philosophical community and that the volume is particularly unrepresentative of female 
philosophers. For several reasons, many female philosophers whose work we strongly admire 
were unable to contribute. This fact is, of course, unfortunate; and it points to some regrettable 
structural challenges facing the discipline. Nevertheless, we do not believe that it detracts from 
the quality, creativity, and insightfulness of the essays collected here. 
We would like to acknowledge several people whose collective efforts enabled this book 
to come into being. We thank the authors for their timely contributions and for working to 
strengthen the essays into their present form. We thank the anonymous referees whose insightful 
and conscientious comments led to refinements in the overall structure and presentation of the 
book and to improvements in the individual essays. We would also like to express our gratitude 
to Andrew Weckenmann, our editor at Routledge, for his patience, direction, and good will. 
Most of all, we are grateful to Robert Audi for his generous advice, which was indispensable to 
the completion of the book, and even to its inception. 
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